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Abstract—We consider the problem of storing data in a
distributed manner over T servers. We require the data (i) to
be recoverable from the T servers, and (ii) to remain private
from any T − 1 colluding servers, where privacy is quantified
in terms of mutual information between the data and all the
information available at the T − 1 colluding servers. For this
model, we determine (i) the fundamental trade-off between
storage size and the level of desired privacy, (ii) the optimal
amount of local randomness necessary at the encoder, and (iii) an
explicit low-complexity coding scheme that solely relies on XOR
operations and that asymptotically (with the data size) matches
the fundamental limits found.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure distributed storage schemes, e.g., [1]–[5], often rely
on the idea of secret sharing as introduced in [6], [7]. Hence,
there is a fundamental lower bound on the required storage
space necessary to securely store information in a distributed
manner. Specifically, in any secret sharing scheme, the total
amount of information that needs to be stored must at least
be equal to the entropy of the secret times the number of
participants, see e.g., [8], and it is thus impossible to reduce the
storage space without any changes to the model assumptions.
To this end, we propose to determine the optimal cost
reduction, in terms of storage space, that can be obtained in
exchange of tolerating a controlled amount of reduced privacy.
This idea is closely related to non-perfect secret sharing
[9], [10] with a non-linear access function that generalize
traditional ramp secret sharing [11]–[13]. Unfortunately, for
large secrets, as required for data storage, no low-complexity
coding scheme is known to implement non-perfect secret
sharing. Note that in the absence of a privacy constraint,
for the related problems of perfect secret sharing and secure
distributed storage, XOR-based coding schemes have been
proposed in [14] and [15], [16], respectively.
We aim to fill this void in this paper and focus on a setting
where a file F needs to be stored at T servers. The data is
intended to be recoverable from these T servers, and needs to
remain private from any T−1 colluding servers. Here, privacy
is quantified in terms of mutual information between the data
and all the information available at the T−1 colluding servers.
This work was supported in part by the NSF under grants CCF-1850227
and CNS-1526547.
To be concrete, consider the example of three servers, i.e.,
T = 3, where the mutual information between the data of
any two servers and the file F must not exceed L , 14H(F ).
Assuming that F is a sequence of uniformly distributed bits,
we split F in four parts (F1, F2, F3, F4) of equal length (for
simplicity we assume here that |F | is a multiple of four), and
we store in the three servers the shares
M1 , (F1‖K1‖F2 ⊕K2 ⊕K4),
M2 , (K2‖K3‖F3 ⊕K1 ⊕K5),
M3 , (K4‖K5‖F4 ⊕K3),
where (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5) are five sequences of uniformly
distributed bits with size |F |/4, ⊕ denotes the XOR operation,
and ‖ denotes concatenation. We remark that all the four
parts (F1, F2, F3, F4) are either stored in clear or encrypted
through a one-time pad. By inspection, one easily sees in this
example that F can be recovered from (M1,M2,M3) and any
two shares leak at most 14H(F ) bits about F . As it will be
shown in the following, the size of the shares is optimal as
well as the amount of local randomness, i.e., the length of
(K1,K2,K3,K4,K5).
Our main contribution is the design of a low-complexity
coding scheme for this problem with arbitrary parameters
L and T that solely relies on XOR operations and that is
asymptotically (with file size) optimal in terms of data storage
and the required amount of local randomness at the encoder.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
formalize the problem in Section II and state our main results
in Section III. Our coding scheme is presented in Section IV.
We present the proofs of our results in the appendix. Finally,
we provide concluding remarks in Section V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Notation: For a, b ∈ R, define Ja, bK , [⌊a⌋, ⌈b⌉] ∩ N and
[a]+ , max(0, a). Let ⊕ denote the XOR operator.
Consider T > 2 servers and define T , J1, T K. Consider a
file F which is a sequence of |F | bits uniformly distributed
over {0, 1}|F |.
Definition 1. A (λ, ρ) coding scheme consists of
• A stochastic encoder e : {0, 1}|F | × {0, 1}ρ →
{0, 1}λT , (F,R) 7→ (Mt)t∈T , which takes as input the
file F to store and a sequence R of ρ ∈ N bits
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}ρ and independent of F ,
and outputs T sequences (referred to as shares in the
following) (Mt)t∈T of length λ ∈ N, where Mt is stored
in Server t ∈ T .
• A decoder d : {0, 1}λT → {0, 1}|F |, (Mt)t∈T 7→ F̂ ,
which takes as input all the T sequences stored at the
servers, and outputs an estimate F̂ of the file F .
Definition 2. For α ∈ [0, 1], a (λ, ρ) coding scheme is said
to be α-private if
H(F |MT ) = 0, (Decodability) (1)
lim
|F |→∞
I(F ;MS)
H(F )
6 α, ∀S ( T , (Privacy) (2)
where we have used the notation MS , (Mt)t∈S , ∀S ( T .
The objective is to design α-private (λ, ρ) coding schemes
with minimal storage size requirement, i.e., minimal λ, and
minimal amount of local randomness requirement at the en-
coder, i.e., minimal ρ.
In the following, one can assume
α < 1− 1/T. (3)
Indeed, if α > 1 − 1/T , i.e., α > T−1T , then the privacy
constraint is trivially satisfied if one splits the file in T parts
of size H(F )/T and store one part in each server.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Theorem 1 (Minimal storage size requirement). For any α-
private (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
lim
|F |→∞
λ
H(F )
> (1 − α).
Theorem 2 (Minimal local randomness requirement). For any
α-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
lim
|F |→∞
ρ
H(F )
> [T (1− α)− 1]+.
Theorem 3 (Achievability). Assume that α = 0 or α = lk , for
some k, l ∈ N∗ with k and l coprime, and α ∈ [0, 1 − 1/T [.
By density of Q in R, such an α can be chosen arbitrarily
close to any point in [0, 1]. The coding scheme in Section IV
is an α-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme with
lim
|F |→∞
λ
H(F )
= (1− α), (4)
lim
|F |→∞
ρ
H(F )
= [T (1− α)− 1]+. (5)
IV. CODING SCHEME
Consider α ∈ [0, 1 − 1/T [ such that α = 0 or α = lk , for
some k, l ∈ N∗ with k and l coprime.
A. Preliminaries
• There exists q ∈ N, r ∈ J0, T − 2K such that
l = q(T − 1) + r, (6)
and one can assume
qT + r < k. (7)
Otherwise, if qT + r = k (one has a similar argument if
qT + r > k), then one can split the file F in k parts of
equal size and store q+1 parts of F in the first r servers
and q parts of F in the remaining servers. The privacy
constraint is satisfied by (6) because any T − 1 servers
have at most q(T − 1)+ r = l parts of F , and (2) holds.
• Note that T (k− l)− k = (T − 1)k− lT > 0 by (3), and
there exists u ∈ N, v ∈ J0, T − 1K such that
T (k − l)− k = uT + v. (8)
We emphasize that l, k, and T are the only parameters of the
coding scheme; q, r, u, and v are obtained as sole functions
of l, k, and T .
B. Coding Scheme
Step 1. Divide the file in k parts (Fi)i∈J1,kK (if necessary, add
β zeros to F , where β is the smallest integer in J1, k − 1K
such that (H(F ) + β)/k ∈ N. For convenience, we write
Fi:j , (Fi′ )i′∈Ji,jK for i, j ∈ J1, kK.
Step 2. Generate Nkeys , T (k − l) − k (> 0
by (8)) keys (Ki)i∈J1,NkeysK each uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}(H(F )+β)/k and independent of all other random vari-
ables. For convenience, we write Ki:j , (Ki′)i′∈Ji,jK for
i, j ∈ J1, NkeysK.
Step 3. We now describe how to design the shares MT . Each
share Mt, stored in Server t ∈ T , is a vector of (k − l)
sequences (labeled from 1 to k − l) of size (H(F ) + β)/k.
For convenience, for t ∈ T , and i, j ∈ J1, k − lK such that
i 6 j, we write Mt[i : j] to designate the sequences of Mt
labeled from i to j, andMt[i] to designate the sequence of Mt
labeled by i. For t ∈ T , the k − l components of the vector
Mt are of one of the following types.
• An unencrypted part of F , i.e., an element of {Fi : i ∈
J1, kK}.
• A key, i.e., an element of {Ki : i ∈ J1, NkeysK};
• An encrypted part of F , obtained by XORing a part of
F with one or several keys.
To precisely describe how the shares MT are chosen we
distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that r + v < T . The unencrypted parts
of F and keys are assigned according to Algorithms 1, 2,
respectively. The encrypted parts of F are defined and assigned
according to Algorithm 4. Note that we have the following.
• For t ∈ J1, rK, Mt consists of k − l sequences: q + 1
unencrypted parts of F , u keys, and
x , k − l − q − 1− u (9)
encrypted parts of F .
• For t ∈ Jr + 1, T − vK, Mt consists of k − l sequences:
q unencrypted parts of F , u keys, and x + 1 encrypted
parts of F .
• For t ∈ JT − v + 1, T K, Mt consists of k − l sequences:
q unencrypted parts of F , u + 1 keys, and x encrypted
parts of F .
Case 2. Assume that r + v > T . The unencrypted parts
of F and keys are assigned according to Algorithms 1, 3,
respectively. The encrypted parts of F are defined and assigned
according to Algorithm 5. Note that we have the following.
• For t ∈ J1, T − vK, Mt consists of k− l sequences: q+1
unencrypted parts of F , u keys, and x encrypted parts
of F .
• For t ∈ JT − v + 1, rK, Mt consists of k − l sequences:
q + 1 unencrypted parts of F , u + 1 keys, and x − 1
encrypted parts of F .
• For t ∈ Jr + 1, T K, Mt consists of k − l sequences: q
unencrypted parts of F , u + 1 keys, and x encrypted
parts of F .
Remark 1. In both cases, the first NPlain , qT + r parts
(Fi)i∈J1,qT+rK are stored unencrypted in the servers, and
the NEncrypted , k − r − Tq (> 0 by (7)) remaining
parts (Fi)i∈JqT+r+1,kK are first encrypted using the keys
(Ki)i∈J1,T (k−l)−kK before being stored in the servers.
Remark 2. In Case 1, we have x > 0, otherwise k − r −
Tq = NEncrypted = (r + v)x + (T − r − v)(x+ 1) < 0, which
contradicts (7). In Case 2, we also have have x > 0, otherwise
k−r−Tq = NEncrypted = (T−v+T−r)x+(r−T+v)(x−1) <
0, which again contradicts (7).
Algorithm 1 Assignment of unencrypted parts
Input: File F
1: for t ∈ T do
2: Mt[1 : q] , F(t−1)q+1:tq
3: if t 6 r then
4: Mt[q + 1] , FTq+t
5: end if
6: end for
Algorithm 2 Assignment of keys when r + v < T
Inputs: Keys (Ki)i∈J1,NkeysK
1: for t ∈ T do
2: if t 6 r then
3: Mt[q + 2 : q + 1 + u] , Ku(t−1)+1:ut
4: else if r < t 6 T − v then
5: Mt[q + 1 : q + u] , Ku(t−1)+1:ut
6: else if t > T − v then
7: Mt[q + 1 : q + u] , Ku(t−1)+1:ut
8: Mt[q + u+ 1] , KTu+t−(T−v)
9: end if
10: Define
It , {j ∈ J1, NkeysK : ∃i ∈ J1, l − kK,Mt[i] = Kj}
11: end for
Algorithm 3 Assignment of keys when r + v > T
Inputs: Keys (Ki)i∈J1,NkeysK
1: for t ∈ T do
2: if t 6 T − v then
3: Mt[q + 2 : q + 1 + u] , Ku(t−1)+1:ut
4: else if T − v < t 6 r then
5: Mt[q + 2 : q + u+ 2]
, Ku(T−v)+(u+1)(t−T+v−1)+1:u(T−v)+(u+1)(t−T+v)
6: else if t > r then
7: Mt[q + 1 : q + u+ 1]
, Ku(T−v)+(u+1)(t−T+v−1)+1:u(T−v)+(u+1)(t−T+v)
8: end if
9: Define
It , {j ∈ J1, NkeysK : ∃i ∈ J1, l− kK,Mt[i] = Kj}
10: end for
Algorithm 4 Creation and assignment of encrypted parts when
r + v < T
Inputs: File F and keys (Ki)i∈J1,NkeysK
1: for i ∈ J1, x+ 1K do
2: for t ∈ T do
3: if t 6 r then
4: j , NPlain + (t− 1)x+ i
5: z ,
{
q + u+ 1 + i if i 6= x+ 1
∅ if i = x+ 1
6: else if r < t 6 T − v then
7: j , NPlain + rx + (t− r − 1)(x+ 1) + i
8: z , q + u+ i
9: else if t > T − v then
10: j , NPlain + rx + (x+ 1)(T − v − r) + (t− T +
v − 1)x+ i
11: z ,
{
q + u+ 1 + i if i 6= x+ 1
∅ if i = x+ 1
12: end if
13: For t′ ∈ T \{t}, choose the key Ka with the smallest
a ∈ It′ , which has not previously been chosen in
this algorithm, among the keys stored in Server t′,
and define κt′ , Ka. If this is not possible, then
define κt′ = 0.
14: If z 6= ∅, then define Mt[z] , Fj ⊕
⊕
t′∈T \{t} κt′
15: end for
16: end for
C. Examples
Example 1 (T = 3, α = 310 ). Write F = (Fi)i∈J1,10K. We
have (l, k) , (3, 10). By (6), we have (q, r) = (1, 1) and
by (8), we have (u, v) = (3, 2). We have r+v = T , so we are
in Case 2. Moreover, NKeys = 11, NPlain = 4, NEncrypted = 6,
x = 2. After running Algorithms 1 and 3, we have
M1 , (F1‖F4‖K1‖K2‖K3‖M1[6]‖M1[7]),
M2 , (F2‖K4‖K5‖K6‖K7‖M2[6]‖M2[7]),
M3 , (F3‖K8‖K9‖K10‖K11‖M3[6]‖M3[7]).
Algorithm 5 Creation and assignment of encrypted parts when
r + v > T
Input: File F
1: for i ∈ J1, xK do
2: for t ∈ T do
3: if t 6 T − v then
4: j , NPlain + (t− 1)x+ i
5: z , q + u+ 1 + i
6: else if T − v < t 6 r then
7: j , NPlain+(T −v)x+(t−T +v−1)(x−1)+ i
8: z ,
{
q + u+ 2 + i if i 6= x
∅ if i = x
9: else if t > r then
10: j , NPlain+(T − v)x+(r−T − v)(x− 1)+ (t−
r − 1)x+ i
11: z , q + u+ 1 + i
12: end if
13: if z 6= ∅ then
14: For t′ ∈ T \{t}, choose the key Ka with the
smallest a ∈ It′ , which has not previously been
chosen in this algorithm, and define κt′ , Ka. If
this is not possible, then define κt′ = 0.
15: Define Mt[z] , Fj ⊕
⊕
t′∈T \{t} κt′
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
After running Algorithm 5, we obtain the encrypted parts of
the file F as
M1[6] , F5 ⊕K4 ⊕K8,
M1[7] , F6 ⊕K6 ⊕K10,
M2[6] , F7 ⊕K1 ⊕K9,
M2[7] , F8 ⊕K3 ⊕K11,
M3[6] , F9 ⊕K2 ⊕K5,
M3[7] , F10 ⊕K7.
Example 2 (T = 5, α = 711 ). We have (l, k) , (7, 11). By (6),
we have (q, r) = (1, 3) and by (8), we have (u, v) = (1, 4).
We have r+v > T , so we are in Case 2. Moreover, NKeys = 9,
NPlain = 8, NEncrypted = 3, x = 1. After running Algorithms 1
and 3 we have
M1 , (F1‖F6‖K1‖M1[4]),
M2 , (F2‖F7‖K2‖K3),
M3 , (F3‖F8‖K4‖K5),
M4 , (F4‖K6‖K7‖M4[4]),
M5 , (F5‖K8‖K9‖M5[4]).
After running Algorithm 5 the encrypted parts of F are
M1[4] , F9 ⊕K2 ⊕K4 ⊕K6 ⊕K8,
M4[4] , F10 ⊕K1 ⊕K3 ⊕K5 ⊕K9,
M5[4] , F11 ⊕K7.
Example 3 (T = 3, α = 517 ). We have (l, k) , (5, 17). By (6),
we have (q, r) = (2, 1) and by (8), we have (u, v) = (6, 1). We
have r + v < T , so we are in Case 1. Moreover, NKeys = 19,
NPlain = 7, NEncrypted = 10, x = 3. After running Algorithms 1
and 2, we have
M1 ,(F1‖F2‖F7‖K1‖K2‖K3‖K4‖K5‖K6
‖M1[10]‖M1[11]‖M1[12]),
M2 ,(F3‖F4‖K7‖K8‖K9‖K10‖K11‖K12
‖M2[9]‖M2[10]‖M2[11]‖M2[12]),
M3 ,(F5‖F6‖K13‖K14‖K15‖K16‖K17‖K18‖K19
‖M3[10]‖M3[11]‖M3[12]).
After running Algorithm 4, the encrypted parts of F are
obtained as follows:
M1[10] , F8 ⊕K7 ⊕K13,
M1[11] , F9 ⊕K9 ⊕K15,
M1[12] , F10 ⊕K11 ⊕K17,
M2[9] , F11 ⊕K1 ⊕K14,
M2[10] , F12 ⊕K3 ⊕K16,
M2[11] , F13 ⊕K5 ⊕K18,
M2[12] , F14 ⊕K19,
M3[10] , F15 ⊕K2 ⊕K8,
M3[11] , F16 ⊕K4 ⊕K10,
M3[12] , F17 ⊕K6 ⊕K12.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the problem of storing a file in T servers
such that the privacy leakage generated by T − 1 colluding
servers with respect to the content of the file is bounded.
The main contribution of this paper is a coding scheme for
this problem that (i) achieves the asymptotically (with the
file size) optimal storage space at the servers, (ii) uses the
optimal amount of local randomness at the encoder, (iii) solely
relies on XOR operations and is thus suited to handle large
amount of data with low-complexity. Generalization of our
XOR-based coding scheme to a threshold access structure, i.e.,
when decodability in (1) and the privacy constraint in (2) are
replaced by
H(F |MA) = 0, ∀A ⊂ T s.t. |A|> t,
lim
|F |→∞
I(F ;MU )
H(F )
6 α, ∀U ⊂ T s.t. |U|6 t− 1
for some t ∈ J1, T − 1K, is under investigation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let S ( T . For any α-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
λ > H(Mt)
> I(F ;Mt|MT \{t})
= H(F |MT \{t})−H(F |MT )
(a)
= H(F |MT \{t})
= H(F )− I(F ;MT \{t})
(b)
> H(F )−H(F )(α+ o(1))
= (1 − α)H(F ) + o(H(F )),
where (a) holds by (1), (b) holds by (2).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For any α-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
ρ+H(F )
(a)
= H(R) +H(F )
(b)
= H(RF )
(c)
> H(MT )
(d)
=
∑
t∈T
H(Mt|M1:t−1)
(e)
>
∑
t∈T
H(Mt|MT \{t})
>
∑
t∈T
I(Mt;F |MT \{t})
(f)
>
∑
t∈T
[(1− α)H(F ) + o(H(F ))]
= T (1− α)H(F ) + o(H(F )),
where (a) holds by uniformity of R, (b) holds by inde-
pendence between F and R, (c) holds because MT is a
deterministic function of (R,F ), (d) holds by the chain rule,
(e) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (f) holds by
the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We will use the following definition in our analysis of the
coding scheme of Section IV.
Definition 3. Consider an encrypted part Et of F stored in
Server t ∈ T as in Line 14 of Algorithm 4, or Line 15 of
Algorithm 5. One can write Et as Et = Fj ⊕
⊕
t′∈T \{t} κt′ ,
where j ∈ J1, kK and for t′ ∈ T \{t}, κt′ ∈ {Ki : i ∈ It′} ∪
{0}. The encrypted part Et is said to be protected by a key
of Server t′ ∈ T , if there exists i ∈ It′ such that κt′ = Ki,
i.e., if κt′ 6= 0.
By construction, it is straightforward to verify that the stor-
age size in (4) and the required amount of local randomness at
the encoder in (5) are satisfied. Next, we prove decodability (1)
and privacy (2).
Decodability: (1) holds because all the parts (Fi)i∈J1,kK of
F are stored in MT : NPlain parts are unencrypted and the
NEncrypted encrypted parts can be decrypted from modulo-2
addition with keys that are all stored in MT .
Privacy: It is sufficient to prove that the privacy constraint
in (2) holds for all the subsets of T with size T − 1, since
I(F ;MS′) 6 I(F ;MS) if S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ T . We will thus prove
that (2) holds for the sets St , T \{t}, t ∈ T . We first define
KSt , FSt , and ESt as all the keys, unencrypted parts of F ,
and encrypted parts of F , respectively, stored in the servers
whose indices are in St. We next consider two cases.
A. Case 1. r + v < T
Remark that
(r − 1)x+ (T − v − r)(x + 1) + vx
= (T − 1)x+ T − v − r
(a)
= (T − 1)(k − l − q − 1− u) + T − v − r
(b)
= 1 + u, (10)
where (a) holds by (9), (b) holds by (6) and (8). We next
consider three cases depending on the value of t ∈ T .
• Assume t 6 r. We have
I(MSt ;F )
= I(KStFStESt ;F )
(a)
= I(KStFStFj(Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F )
= I(KStFStFj ;F ) + I((Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F |KStFStFj)
(b)
= I(FStFj ;F ) + I((Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F |KStFStFj)
(c)
6 I(FStFj ;F ) + I((Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ; (Fs(i))i∈It)
(d)
6 l(H(F ) + β)/k +
∑
i∈It
I(Fs(i) ⊕Ki;Fs(i))
(e)
= α(H(F ) + β), (11)
where (a) holds for some j ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK and
(s(i))i∈It ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK
|It| as follows. Note indeed
that Server t stores |It|= u keys and all the other servers
store (r − 1)x + (T − v − r)(x + 1) + vx = u + 1
(by (10)) encrypted parts of F , hence, considering the
encrypted parts ESt of all the servers in St, all but one are
protected by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 4.
(b) holds because KSt is independent of F , (c) holds by
the chain rule and because (KSt , (Fi)i∈J1,kK\{s(i):i∈It})
is independent from (Fs(i), Fs(i) ⊕ Ki)i∈It , (d) holds
because FSt contains (r − 1)(q + 1) + (T − r)q = l− 1
(by (6)) parts of F , (e) holds by the one-time pad [17].
• Assume r + 1 6 t 6 T − v. We have
I(MSt ;F )
= I(KStFStESt ;F )
(a)
= I(KStFSt(Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F )
(b)
6 α(H(F ) + β),
where (a) holds for some (s(i))i∈It ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK
|It|
as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |It|= u keys,
and all the other servers store rx+ (T − v− r − 1)(x+
1)+vx = u (by (10)) encrypted parts of F . Hence, all the
encrypted parts ESt of all the servers in St are protected
by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 4. (b) holds
similar to (11) because FSt contains r(q+1)+ (T − r−
1)q = l (by (6)) parts of F .
• Assume t > T − v + 1. The proof of (11) is identical to
Subcase ii by remarking that (i) Server t stores |It|= u+1
keys, and all the other servers store rx+(T −v− r)(x+
1) + (v − 1)x = u + 1 (by (10)) encrypted parts of F ,
and (ii) FSt contains r(q+1)+(T − r−1)q = l (by (6))
parts of F .
B. Case 2. r + v > T
Remark that
(T − v − 1)x+ (r − T + v)(x− 1) + (T − r)x
= (r − 1)x+ (T − v − r)(x + 1) + vx
= 1 + u, (12)
where the last equality holds by (10). We next consider three
cases depending on the value of t ∈ T .
• Assume t 6 T − v. We have
I(MSt ;F )
= I(KStFStESt ;F )
(a)
= I(KStFStFj(Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F )
(b)
6 α(H(F ) + β), (13)
where (a) holds for some j ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK and
(s(i))i∈It ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK
|It| as follows. Note indeed
that Server t stores |It|= u keys and all the other servers
store (T −v−1)x+(r−T +v)(x−1)+(T −r)x = u+1
(by (12)) encrypted parts of F , hence, considering the
encrypted parts ESt of all the servers in St, all but
one are protected by a key of Server t by Line 15
of Algorithm 5. (b) holds similar to (11) because FSt
contains (r− 1)(q+1)+ (T − r)q = l− 1 (by (6)) parts
of F .
• Assume r < t 6 T − v. We have
I(MSt ;F )
= I(KStFStESt ;F )
(a)
= I(KStFStFj(Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F )
(b)
6 α(H(F ) + β),
where (a) holds for some j ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK and
(s(i))i∈It ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK
|It| as follows. Note indeed
that Server t stores |It|= u + 1 keys, and all the other
servers store (T−v)x+(r−T+v−1)(x−1)+(T−r)x =
u+2 (by (12)) encrypted parts of F , hence, considering
the encrypted parts ESt of all the servers in St, all
but one are protected by a key of Server t by Line 15
of Algorithm 5. (b) holds similar to (11) because FSt
contains (r− 1)(q+1)+ (T − r)q = l− 1 (by (6)) parts
of F .
• Assume t > T − v + 1. We have
I(MSt ;F )
= I(KStFStESt ;F )
(a)
= I(KStFSt(Fs(i) ⊕Ki)i∈It ;F )
(b)
6 α(H(F ) + β),
where (a) holds for some (s(i))i∈It ∈ JNPlain + 1, kK
|It|
as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |It|= u + 1
keys, and all the other servers store (T − v)x+(r−T +
v)(x − 1) + (T − r − 1)x = 1 + u (by (12)) encrypted
parts of F . Hence, all the encrypted parts ESt of all the
servers in St are protected by a key of Server t by Line 15
of Algorithm 5. (b) holds similar to (11) because FSt
contains r(q+1)+ (T − r− 1)q = l (by (6)) parts of F .
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